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Policing in East Germany in the wake of
the Second World War
Richard Bessel
1 The emergence of Europe from the social, economic, psychological and political rubble of
the Second World War forms one of the great defining stories of the twentieth century2.
Across the continent, Europeans faced the challenge of establishing social and political
order  in  the  wake of  the  vast  explosion of  violence  and destruction which had just
occurred. In that part of Germany which fell under Soviet control in 1945 – the Soviet
Occupation Zone, then from 1949 the German Democratic Republic – this challenge was
particularly difficult. East Germany emerged from Nazism and war to be occupied by the
Soviet  Army,  confronted  with  economic  collapse,  flooded  with  refugees,  and
overwhelmed  by  crime,  with  German  state  institutions  abolished,  the  population
traumatised by violence, and half its young men either dead or in prisoner-of-war camps.
While western Germany generally had suffered more from Allied bombing than did what
became the Soviet  Occupation Zone,  the latter  contained not  only some of  the most
thoroughly devastated cities – most prominently, Magdeburg and Dresden – but also wide
swathes of countryside and numerous small towns which had been laid waste during the
ferocious battles of the last weeks of war. The result was a landscape of ruins, a site of
almost unimaginable economic collapse, social upheaval and human misery.
2 This landscape of ruins provided a most unpromising base from which to begin the task of
re-establishing order in what would become the German Democratic Republic. Some idea
of what faced the German ‘anti-fascists’ who arrived in the wake of the Red Army and
were charged with rebuilding administrative structures, can be gained from an ‘activity
report’ for the period May-November 1945 filed by the Landrat of the District of Demmin,
in Pomerania (not far from the new border to Poland):
On  15  May  1945,  after  the  Red  Army  had  marched  in  on  30  April  1945,  I  was
confirmed [as Landrat] by the [Soviet] war commandant. The district, above all the
town of Demmin, had suffered particularly heavy damage. 365 houses, roughly 70
per cent of the town, lay in ruins, over 700 inhabitants had ended their lives by
suicide. Everywhere there was rubble and debris. As any coordinated direction of
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the regional government and of government authorities was lacking, I had to take
charge in all areas and in all branches of the administration, naturally in agreement
with the commandant.
All branches of the district administration had to be reconstructed, and new office
space had to be found and furnished, as most of the [government] records had been
destroyed.  At  first  it  was  necessary  to  provide  the  population,  especially  the
inhabitants of the three towns [of the district], including the many refugees, with
food and to accommodate the homeless. Accordingly, the greatest concern involved
agriculture,  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  fields  were  cultivated  and  the  harvest
brought in. [...]
While at first a few former members of the Nazi Party had to be taken on as skilled
workers,  they nevertheless soon were removed from all  public  offices and from
leading  positions  in  the  economy  and  replaced  by  antifascists.  In  order  to  get
economic life moving again, I restored the three branch railway lines in the district.
Unfortunately they were dismantled after a short period. [...]
Great difficulties arose with the industrial  enterprises,  as these had been either
largely  destroyed  or  dismantled  by  commandos  of  the  Red  Army.  [...].  One
attempted to get all production started again by the most elementary means.
Bringing in the harvest and threshing the grain gave us great difficulties, as most of
the machines had been confiscated and most of the horses had been driven away.
By calling up all available labour the work nevertheless was accomplished, and the
delivery quota was met, despite all the damage caused us by what the Red Army
took without payment and without receipt, for example from 72 communities: 1,767
cattle, 896 pigs, 4,106 sheep, 32 calves, 2,221 chickens, 100,997 eggs, 282 geese and
142,200 kilograms of grain. [...]
In  the district  there are  now about  54,000 refugees,  whose accommodation and
feeding creates ever greater difficulties. [...]
The  spread  of  typhus  is  due  primarily  to  the  insufficient  nourishment  and
[resulting] debilitation. [...] An examination of all inhabitants between 15 and 45
years of age for venereal disease has been ordered and will be carried out with the
help of police control points. [...]
The mood of the population is for the most part solemn and depressed. There are
complaints about insufficient distribution of food. In addition the lack of clothing
and footwear, especially among the resettlers [i.e. refugees], is especially noticeable
with the onset of the cold weather. We have not yet received any of the promised
allocations.
The accommodation of the resettlers creates particular difficulties. To the roughly
53,000 inhabitants of the district 54,000 resettlers have been added already. They
were put up [first] in transit camps in the district and then distributed among the
villages, since the commandant has prohibited migration into the towns3.
3 The challenges which such conditions posed for any attempt to establish social order and
construct a new political and economic order in postwar East Germany, and for the new
police force which would bear a major share of the responsibility for enforcing that order,
were enormous. The once-vaunted German bureaucracy largely had ceased to function by
May  1945,  and  the  resources  available  to  those  who  had  to  get  the  administrative
machinery moving again were minimal; the German ‘antifascists’ put into posts by the
Soviet military had to deal first with a bureaucracy inherited from the hated Nazi regime
and then with the lack of trained personnel once the old guard had been removed; in the
northern portions of the Soviet Occupation Zone, including the district of Demmin, half
the population were homeless and destitute refugees from east of the new Oder-Neiße
border (in the Zone as a whole the proportion was about a quarter)4;  attempts to get
production moving and to feed the population were seriously undermined by the actions
(both  official  and  unofficial)  of  the  Soviet  military,  which  ranged  from  dismantling
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railways  and factories  to  stealing  livestock  and personal  property –  and to  raping  a
substantial proportion of the German female population5;  and an undernourished and
often ill population looked on sullenly as the Soviet occupiers and their German placemen
took over what remained of German government offices.
4 In the description of conditions in Demmin quoted above, the police were mentioned only
once: they were expected to help carry out checks on adults for venereal disease. This is
not because policing was unimportant in postwar Germany; during a period of extreme
social upheaval and disorder and high levels of crime, and when East Germany’s new
masters were determined to remove ‘fascists’ from positions of power and responsibility
in general and from police ranks in particular, the creation of a politically reliable and
operationally competent police force was a major concern. However, in the immediate
aftermath of the German defeat,  the new East German ‘People’s Police’  (Volkspolizei)
comprised a small,  mostly unarmed and largely ineffective force.  Initially the task of
imposing order, of a sort, fell to the Red Army – whose soldiers, of course, also caused
widespread fear and disorder by assaulting, raping, and stealing from the Germans under
their control. It is hardly surprising that, initially, neither the Soviet military authorities
nor the German Communists (many of whom had suffered at the hands of German police
under the Nazis) were prepared to trust a German police force very far with the task of
law enforcement. So soon after the Gestapo had exercised its reign of terror and German
police units had killed tens of thousands of innocent civilians in eastern Europe, allowing
German  police  to  check  people  for  venereal  disease  was  one  thing,  equipping  (and
arming) them so that they might effectively combat crime – much of which was being
committed by Soviet soldiers – was quite another.
5 Nevertheless, soon after the Soviet military had taken control of what became the Soviet
Occupation Zone and later the German Democratic Republic, Germans began to be given
responsibility for public  order and security.  Local  officials –  the mayors and Landräte
placed in their posts by the Russians – were delegated the task of setting up local police
forces6.  The new police recruits were drawn as far as was possible from the ranks of
‘proven anti-fascists’ – veterans of the labour movement, workers who were known to
have supported the Communists; people who had worked in the police formations of the
Nazi regime were removed. The men placed in charge of the new ‘People’s Police’ were
determined to make a sharp break with the Nazi past, to root out ‘fascists’ in this most
sensitive and important sphere, and to put policing in East Germany on a new footing
appropriate to the new political era. Georg König, Chief of the Police in the Province of
Saxony, put it thus in May 1946:
The police in the new democratic state is in its essence and in its tasks something
different than what it was in the Nazi state, which had to maintain its terror regime
precisely through the police, especially the ‘Secret State Police’ [Gestapo]. Today
the police really shall be the helper and protector of all sections of the people who
are well-intentioned and willing to engage in rebuilding. It must become a People’s
Police in the best sense of the word7.
6 Similarly,  in  August  1946  Hans  Kahle,  the  Chief  of  Police  in  the  Land Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, wrote to all members of his force:
In the new democratic state coming into being, the member of the police is the
servant of the German people. It is to the people that he is to devote all his powers,
all his abilities and knowledge. Therefore his relationship to the individual among
the people is not one of a superior to an inferior but one of a carer and counsellor
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to  whom  the  population  should  turn  in  confidence  with  its  needs,  cares and
concerns8.
7 Such declarations should not be dismissed as mere cynical propaganda or self-delusion on
the part of the committed Communists who headed the police after 1945. There existed a
genuine desire to put policing on a revolutionary new footing, and to replace the disorder
which followed from Germany’s  disastrous  war  and defeat  with  a  new,  ‘progressive’
political  order.  Of  course,  a  ‘People’s  Police  in  the  best  sense  of  the  word’  was  not
supposed to be politically neutral;  it  was clear to all  concerned that the Volkspolizei
would be a ‘helper’ only to those people who were ‘well-intentioned and willing to engage
in rebuilding’. Those who might have been otherwise inclined, who allied themselves or
were seen to ally themselves – or were seen as likely to ally themselves – with the ‘class
enemy’, could expect rather different treatment.
8 But this is getting a bit ahead of ourselves. After May 1945 the recruitment of a police
who the German Communists and their Soviet masters felt they could trust led to the
almost complete replacement of the police personnel in the Soviet Zone, and opened the
Volkspolizei to people almost none of whom ever had been in police uniform before.
Internal statistics compiled with obsessive energy on the composition of the police during
the post-war years confirm that, as the German Administration of the Interior estimated
in its ‘Annual Report for 1946-1947’, ‘over 90 per cent of the members of the police in the
Soviet Occupation Zone are people from outside the profession [berufsfremde Menschen]’9.
The statistics which the German Administration of the Interior compiled for June 1947,
for example, show that of the 39,683 recorded members of the Volkspolizei in the Soviet
Zone, only 2101 (6.0%) had worked in the police before 1945 and a further 940 (2.7%)
before 193310. These statistics frame a remarkable picture: of a police force with almost no
continuity from the past, which had broken completely with traditional sources of police
recruitment (for example, sons of policemen and the military), and whose new members
could not easily learn to behave like police officers by observing the conduct of more
experienced colleagues. For the first time in modern German history, a police force was
created with an almost completely new membership and which represented a radical
break with the past11.
9 This police force faced a remarkable set of challenges. In a society which had experienced
the  most  profound  social  and  political  upheaval –  with  most  of  its  cities  and  wide
stretches of its countryside destroyed, much of its population homeless refugees, a large
proportion of its young men dead or in prisoner-of-war camps and a large proportion of
its  women  raped,  without  adequate  food  supplies,  emerging  from  the  complete
destruction of the German state power and the absolute moral bankruptcy of National
Socialism, and occupied by a foreign armed force – the natural desire was for a return to
some semblance of security and normality12. Times of extreme upheaval produce extreme
longing for  stability  and normality.  However,  that  stability  and normality  comprised
precisely what was denied the inhabitants of the Soviet Occupation Zone and then the
German Democratic Republic. Instead, in the years following the destruction of the ‘Third
Reich’, East Germany was forced down a path of political and economic transformation of
far-reaching proportions. Rather than let the people under their control rebuild their
lives in peace, East German Communists (supported by the Soviet occupiers) imposed a
regime  of  continual  mobilisation  and  upheaval.  The  upheaval  of  war,  defeat  and
occupation was followed by the upheaval of a Stalinist political revolution.
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10 This meant that the ‘People’s Police’  had to mediate between a regime committed to
continued upheaval and a people who, for the most part, wanted just the opposite. The
new police formations were in an extraordinarily difficult position: they were largely
inexperienced and untrained; they had to deal with day-to-day policing problems which
were, in the immediate postwar years, enormous; their powers to enforce the law were
initially greatly circumscribed by the Soviet Military Administration (which had the final
say when it came to policing); they were regarded with scepticism, to say the least, by a
large  proportion  of  a  population  which  was  unfavourably  disposed  to  both  Soviet-
inspired  socialism and  the  Soviet  occupiers;  they  were  charged  with  protecting  and
enforcing a political order which, in essence, was imposed by an enemy occupation force
and its domestic allies; and their political masters felt a deep distrust of a population
(including the working class)  which only a few years before had supported Hitler so
enthusiastically13. What is more, immediately after the war the new East German police
force was quite small and had few resources at its disposal. In January 1946 the total
personnel (both male and female, including clerical staff) of the German police in the
Soviet  Occupation Zone was  a  mere  21,973 –  or  just  over  one  police  officer  per  one
thousand inhabitants14. Even in an orderly society this would have been a rather small
number; it is less than the total (roughly 27,400) employed in 2001 by the police in Berlin
alone15. What this meant on the ground may be illustrated by the situation in, once again,
the rural Pomeranian district of Demmin, where in August 1945 the police numbered only
85 people in a district containing roughly 90,000 inhabitants16. Given that, at best, only
about half of these police would have been on duty at any one time, the rather sparse
nature of policing in East Germany immediately after the war is evident, at least in so far
as German (as opposed to Soviet) police personnel is concerned.
11 In almost  every respect  the German police forces  in the Soviet  Zone faced crippling
problems in the first two years of their existence. As noted above, the new police recruits
were almost completely inexperienced, having been chosen for political reliability rather
than professional competence or previous service in police formations (something which
usually served to disqualify people for employment in the newly-formed Volkspolizei)17.
They tended to be relatively old,  since trusted ‘anti-fascists’  often were either Social
Democrats  or  Communists  from  the  Weimar  period  or  people  who  had  had  some
experience of underground or trade-union activity, and thus were older than the sorts of
people normally recruited into a police force; the fact that immediately after the war
most of Germany’s young men were either dead or in prisoner-of-war camps left the
Volkspolizei little alternative. According to internal statistics on the personnel structure
of the police throughout the Soviet Zone in June 1947, 31.8% of the Schutzpolizei (i.e., the
regular police who performed the everyday tasks of policing on the beat) as a whole, and
fully 30.5% of the rank-and-file, were over 40 years old18. As the head of the police in
Bitterfeld  explained  in  October  1946,  ‘many  tested  anti-fascists,  who  came  from
workshops and factories’, initially had been taken into the new force, and ‘these were in
many cases older comrades whose mental abilities were not sufficient to master service in
the police’19. Many had joined the force neither out of political conviction nor out of some
altruistic desire to serve the public but primarily in order to gain food (ration cards),
clothing  (uniforms,  boots)  and  shelter  (police  barracks)  during  a  time  of  terrible
shortages,  and  many  were  underweight  and  prone  to  illness20,  which  was  hardly
surprising given the miserable conditions in postwar Germany. Almost none had had any
specific training for their new job. Even after police training schools had been set up in all
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the east German Länder, following the opening of the first such school in Saxony in March
1946, only a small proportion could be schooled in their new profession quickly; in April
1947 Walter Mickinn, Head of the Personnel Section of the German Administration of the
Interior,  reported that in Thuringia ‘roughly 65%’ of the police still  had not received
training, in Brandenburg 70%, and in Sachsen-Anhalt and Mecklenburg the figure was
94% and 95% respectively21.  The newly-hired recruits  frequently  adopted a  decidedly
casual  approach  to  their  duties,  and  they  often  proved  to  be  ill-disciplined  and/or
corrupt;  cases  of  drunkenness  and theft  among the ‘People’s  Police’  were common22.
Altogether, this was not a police force in a particularly good condition to impose order on
a profoundly disordered society.
12 Matters were complicated further by the fact that the new People’s Police were extremely
poorly equipped. Initially the Allies prohibited the German police from carrying firearms,
and not until 1946, after the Allied Control Council lifted the ban (in January), did the
Soviet occupation authorities permit the bulk of the German police in their zone to be
armed23. Nevertheless, and despite the urgings of the German Communist leadership (and
of Walter Ulbricht in particular), even in late 1946 only 30 per cent of the personnel of
many police units had firearms. This made it all but impossible for them effectively to
confront armed criminals, at a time when there were substantial numbers of illegal arms
at large, and bred what was described by the Volkspolizei leadership as ‘a passivity within
the police which can have catastrophic consequences for public order and security’24. The
police possessed few if any motor vehicles, and even bicycles were a rarity (and bicycle
tyres difficult to acquire),  making the idea of police mobility little more than a joke;
indeed,  as  late  as  October  1948  the  Volkspolizei  in  Sachsen-Anhalt  complained that,
because the police lacked bicycles and bicycle tyres, they were in no position to protect
farmers’ fields effectively from thieves who had bicycles and therefore were ‘far better
equipped than the police officers chasing them’25. The police authorities possessed little
or nothing in the way of working telecommunications equipment, since the telephone
network had been wrecked during the war in large sections of the Zone and since the
Soviet authorities initially did not allow the German police radio communication; not
until 1947 did they permit the German police to get their own telex network26. This meant
that during the first couple of years after the war it was virtually impossible for police
stations  to  communicate  quickly  with  one  another  or  for  local  commanders  to
communicate with their superiors or subordinates.  This in turn made it all  the more
difficult to impose and maintain discipline and good working practices throughout police
ranks, and it is hardly surprising that, in such circumstances, clear-up rates for crime
initially were disappointingly low27.
13 Additional problems stemmed from the Soviet military presence itself. The new police
forces  often  found  themselves  caught  between  the  concerns  of  a  population  which
nominally they existed to protect and the demands and actions of the Soviet military to
which they ultimately were responsible. During the immediate postwar period, Soviet
soldiers were a major source of crime, which began with the orgy of rape and other
violence which accompanied their arrival in Germany in the winter and spring of 1945
and which continued to make the Soviet Occupation Zone a very dangerous place long
after the German surrender. Not just the civilian population but members of the police
forces too became targets for the violence of the occupier, and those German police who
attempted to intervene in cases where Russian soldiers raped German women risked
arrest or being shot28. During the postwar years the rise and fall of violent crime, often by
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armed ‘bandits’ who frequently were Soviet soldiers or deserters, were mirrored in the
numbers  of  casualties  among  the  Volkspolizei:  from  May  to  December  1945  37
Volkspolizisten were killed in violent incidents; in 1946 the number rose to 87; while in
1947 the number dropped to 26 (although by this time the total number of German police
in the Soviet  Zone had risen substantially)29.  At  the  same time,  German police  were
expressly  forbidden  from using  firearms  against  Soviet  soldiers  no  matter  what  the
provocation – a ban which continued in force once the Volkspolizei was well armed in the
late 1940s. This even was spelled out publicly: in 1948 in the new illustrated journal, Die
Volkspolizei, members of the Volkspolizei were informed in no uncertain terms that ‘use of
weapons  must  never  and  under  no  circumstances  be  made  against  members  of  the
occupation  forces’30.  Effectively,  in  one  of  the  most  important  areas  of  policing,  i.e.
dealing with violent crime, the hands of the Volkspolizei were tied.
14 This left economic crime as a main focus for police work, hardly surprising given the
dreadful  economic  problems confronting  almost  all  Germans  after  the  war.  Dreadful
shortages, rampant inflation, a thriving black market, and the division of Germany into
separate economic zones created numerous opportunities to engage in economic crime.
Consequently,  the  day-to-day  activities  of  the  police  were  directed in  large  measure
towards  combating the black market  throughout  the Soviet  Zone and the smuggling
which was rampant across the demarcation line with the western occupation zones of
Germany31.  The police constantly mounted raids (for example,  at  railway stations)  in
order to throttle black-market trading and arrest the perpetrators of a crime which not
only undermined economic order but also provided socialists with the worst example of
unbridled  free  enterprise,  and  in  rural  districts  the  ‘main  task’  for  the  police  was
enforcing the mandatory delivery of  farm produce32.  However,  while such campaigns
were fully compatible with the political aims of the German Communist leadership and
the Soviet authorities, they also complicated the relationship of the ‘People’s Police’ with
the people it was supposed to serve. What the people desired – physical security above
all – the police could not yet deliver; and what the police could and did provide often was
not exactly what was desired by a population which had to evade controls and to resort to
illegal commerce in order to acquire basic necessities. Comments drafted in early 1947 by
the Volkspolizei leadership about popular attitudes towards the police gives a sense of
the predicament faced in this regard by the German forces of law and order in the Soviet
Zone:
The  unpopularity  of  the  police  is  not  accounted  for  only  by  unsatisfactory
personnel policies, social difficulties and shortcomings (in statutes, schooling, etc.),
but also has its causes in the present-day economic situation of the population.
The police very frequently are compelled to intervene against small-scale hoarders
[Klein-Hamsterer], who are trying to improve their diet by buying additional food.
The  police  are  encouraged  to  confiscate  even  the  smallest  amounts.  Since  the
population for the most part has no appreciation of this, these measures by the
police  are  regarded  as  unjust.  It  has  even  happened  that  hoarders  and  people
stealing from fields have carried out attacks on the police and the organisations
helping them33.
15 The ‘People’s Police’ thus were caught between the demands of their Soviet and German
Communist masters and of their job on the one hand, and a widely-held popular sense of
justice and injustice on the other34.  At a time of severe shortages and great material
hardship, and in a territory occupied by a foreign military force for which there was little
affection,  the  ‘People’s  Police’  inevitably  aroused  the  hostility  of  the  people.  This
effectively undermined the hopes, however genuinely felt, of leading figures who had
Policing in East Germany in the wake of the Second World War
Crime, Histoire &amp; Sociétés / Crime, History &amp; Societies, Vol. 7, n°2 | 2009
7
founded the Volkspolizei, that the new police force would be one to which ‘the population
should turn in confidence with its needs, cares and concerns’35.
16 The disquiet which unpopular policing duties aroused was not confined to the civilian
population. It also surfaced among the police themselves, where resentment about having
to do the bidding of the foreign occupying power was widely felt. This was compounded
by the fact that a large proportion of German police manpower had to be devoted to
guarding Soviet installations and Soviet-controlled factories – manpower which then was
unavailable for protecting the interests and ensuring the safety of the German civilian
population36.  Thus,  for  example,  in  August  1947  a  leading  member  of  the  district
committee  of  the  Socialist  Unity  Party  in  Cottbus  (where  in  the  spring  of  1947  the
demands of the Soviet authorities had left only about a quarter of the police available to
see to the needs of the German population) observed in an internal report about the
condition of the local police that there existed within police ranks ‘generally a negative
attitude towards the Russian occupation force’: ‘Not infrequently there are cases in which
police  officers,  including  those  in  senior  positions,  react  to  requests  of  the  Russian
occupation force by saying, why should we do work for the Russians, they also steal from
us’37.  More than in any other field of their activity,  in their dealings with the Soviet
military the ‘People’s Police’ found themselves in the uncomfortable position of having to
transgress  popular opinion.  The fundamental  contradictions facing a ‘People’s  Police’
which was to be ‘of the people, for the people’38 and which had to enforce a political order
imposed on a defeated and resentful people, was plain even to the police themselves.
17 In addition to combating economic crime amidst the postwar shortages and to patrolling
the streets in order to prevent, as far as was possible for a small largely unarmed force,
burglaries, robberies and assaults, the Volkspolizei had other responsibilities. Among the
first tasks allotted to the new local police formations once they had been called into being
in 1945 was setting up functioning ‘Residents Registration Offices’ (Einwohnermeldeämter)
and registering the local inhabitants39.  At a time when typewriters and paper were in
extremely short supply this was not easy, and was made all the more difficult by the fact
that a large proportion of the population of the Soviet Zone consisted of refugees whose
papers could not be found and whose background (and supposed political  reliability)
could  not  be  checked.  Another  task,  and  one  which  assumed  a  steadily  growing
importance for the Volkspolizei, was the suppression of political dissent. Already during
its first years of operation the Volkspolizei was becoming preoccupied with the need to
suppress all signs of political opposition, such as the ‘distribution of leaflets with fascist
slogans’40. In the years to come, as the immediate problems of policing a chaotic postwar
society  ebbed, this  field  of  activity  would  grow  substantially;  as  crime  fell  and  the
numbers of police rose, more and more attention was devoted to the need to expose and
root out ‘saboteurs’ and ‘agents’ allegedly working for the class enemy to the west.
18 One area of work which now soaks up a major proportion of police resources was still a
relatively a minor concern for the Volkspolizei in its early years, however: dealing with
motor-vehicle traffic and accidents. There was rather little civilian traffic in the Soviet
Zone;  much of  the  traffic  (and accidents)  on East  German roads  involved the Soviet
military;  and  the  German police  themselves  had  hardly  any  motor  vehicles  at  their
disposal. The task of directing traffic in the cities and towns was allotted in large measure
to  women who  had  been  recruited  into  the  new police  force,  a  sign  perhaps  of  its
secondary importance41. Other tasks performed by female members of the Volkspolizei
were  of  more  obvious  importance,  in  particular  their  involvement  in  campaigns  to
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combat  prostitution  and  venereal  disease,  which  were  significant  concerns  in  the
immediate postwar years.
19 Although the Volkspolizei was conceived of in clearly political terms from the outset,
policing social and political upheaval immediately after the war meant for the most part
dealing with everyday concerns. Initially at least, the more serious and overtly political
matters were dealt with by the Soviet military and secret police apparatus42. However, as
it  grew  and  developed  against  the  background  of  the  increasingly  bitter  Cold  War
externally and of Stalinisation internally, the Volkspolizei became steadily more political
in its approach to policing. Already by the summer of 1947 the idea that ‘the police has
nothing to do with politics, [that] the police must remain unpolitical’ had become a target
for derision and cause for the concern of East German Communists with responsibility for
‘justice and police’43. During the years which followed, the Volkspolizei leadership made
clear time and again that this police force was to be explicitly political. Criminality and
the efforts to combat it, as well as the behaviour of individuals within the Volkspolizei,
were to be assessed against political criteria and from a ‘class standpoint’. As an officer of
the Thuringian Volkspolizei put it at a conference at the end of 1949: ‘Police work is party
work. One cannot separate these concepts’44. The ‘People’s Police’ were not expected to be
impartial  enforcers  of  the  law.  New  recruits  had  to  swear  their  oath  of  allegiance
recognising ‘that the Volkspolizei was created in order to protect the interests of the
working people from all fascist, reactionary and other elements which are enemies of the
working  people’45.  The  ‘People’s  Police’  were  expected  explicitly  to  side  with  the
‘progressive’ forces of the new anti-fascist-democratic, then socialist order against the
forces of reaction. This expectation reflected not so much a need to deal with the social
upheaval  created  by  the  catastrophes  of  war,  Nazism  and  occupation  as  it  did  a
determination to  carry out  a  revolutionary political transformation.  Any pretence of
impartial policing was abandoned, as the Volkspolizei diverged ever more starkly from
the politically neutral model of policing to which at least lip service is paid in pluralist
political  systems.  As East  German Police Chief  Karl  Maron put it  in a well-publicised
speech in February 1953, ‘the Volkspolizei can never be «neutral» or «unpolitical»’46.
20 The overt politicisation of the Volkspolizei paralleled the physical transformation of the
organisation,  as  the  new ‘People’s  Police’  did  not  remain small,  decentralised  or  ill-
equipped for very long. A process of rapid expansion already had begun by mid-1946,
when the German Administration of the Interior was created by (secret) order of the
Soviet  Military  Administration:  the  total  number  of  German  police  in  the  Soviet
Occupation Zone rose from 21,973 in January 1946 to 38,767 in July 1947, 54,729 in April
1948, 68,148 in September 1948 and to 83,178 (including the 18,229 members of the Border
Police – Grenzpolizei –  and the paramilitary Bereitschaften)  in March 194947.  It  would be
mistaken to assume that this remarkable growth was primarily a response to high levels
of crime; indeed, the ordinary police formations – the Schutzpolizei, the police officers who
patrolled the streets of East Germany – were the formations which grew least quickly.
Rather, the number of police rose as crime fell; the postwar crime wave peaked in late
1946/early 1947, and during 1947 and 1948 recorded crime diminished in the Soviet Zone
48 – precisely when the Volkspolizei was expanding most rapidly. The motives for this
expansion of  the  police  were  largely  political,  and it  occurred at  least  partly  at  the
insistence of the Soviet Military Administration, which was concerned to see the Germans
take over security tasks – under Soviet supervision of course. Thus the Border Police were
created in November 1946 at the order of the Soviet authorities, who wanted the Germans
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to help patrol the border with the western occupation zones, and 1948 saw the creation of
the paramilitary Bereitschaften, which formed the kernel of what eventually became the
East  German National  People’s  Army.  In  any event,  the  impetus  for  the  growth and
militarisation of the East German police appears to have been not a concern about the
security needs of the civilian population but rather a determination to secure political
control as the Cold War came to dominate European political life.
21 Control of a reliable and effective police force was crucial to the imposition of a political
and economic system which lacked the support of a large proportion of the population
and, later, to the creation of a new East German military establishment. This is what lay
behind the far-reaching changes which the Volkspolizei underwent during the crucial
year of 1948. With the urgent problems of the immediate postwar period now past, the
intensification of the Cold War and the transformation of the Socialist Unity Party into a
party  of  a  ‘new type’  was  reflected  in  a  transformation  of  the  police  in  the  Soviet
Occupation Zone which involved reorganisation and purges. In July 1948 Kurt Fischer
(who had spent the war in the USSR and who then had served as Minister of the Interior
in Saxony) was named President of the German Administration of the Interior and Chief
of the German People’s Police (replacing Erich Reschke); and during the summer of 1948
‘Political Culture’ (Polit-Kultur) sections designed to enforce ideological conformity and
discipline were introduced into the Volkspolizei, mirroring developments elsewhere in
the  growing east  German administration and following the  model  established in  the
Soviet  military and police  forces49.  Until  his  sudden death in June 1950,  after  which
command of the Volkspolizei fell to Karl Maron, Fischer worked energetically to turn the
east German police into a thoroughly centralised, politicised and increasingly militarised
force. Behind Fischer stood Walter Ulbricht: it is clear that, right from the beginning
Ulbricht was the driving force among the German communists in the Soviet Zone and
possessed an authority far greater than that of his comrades, especially in matters
involving the all-important area of security and policing. Ulbricht’s main concern clearly
was not alleviating the effects of  social  upheaval;  he was focused single-mindedly on
securing, maintaining and increasing political power.
22 The nature of the police and of policing changed rapidly in East Germany during the late
1940s. The ad hoc approach which had characterised the establishment of the new police
forces  immediately  after  the  war  was  replaced  by  ever  tighter  central  control  and
political and ideological discipline. By early 1948 Ernst Melsheimer, who later became the
Chief Public Prosecutor of the German Democratic Republic, could boast at a conference
of the Committee on Legal Questions with the Central Secretariat of the Socialist Unity
Party that ‘we have control of the police’ (‘Die Polizei hat man in der Hand’)50. As the
police grew larger, better equipped and more powerful, the focus on everyday policing
matters was relegated behind an ever greater emphasis on the political purpose of the
‘People’s Police’. Initial preoccupation with the day-to-day concerns of a civil society in a
state  of  considerable  social  upheaval  was  overshadowed by  the  militarisation  of  the
Volkspolizei, as the Soviet occupation authorities entrusted more and more security tasks
to their German Communist allies, and by the development of what later was to become
the vast secret-police empire of the Stasi51. Against the background of an increasingly
bitter Cold War and the Stalinisation of the East German political system, the ‘People’s
Police’ became a thoroughly politicised, centralised, militarised force. The Volkspolizei
was to be, as Heinz Hoffmann (at that time Deputy Chief of the Volkspolizei and later,
from  1960  until  his  death  in  1985,  East  German  Minister  of  Defence)  wrote  in  the
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magazine Die Volkspolizei in February 1950, ‘the bearer of arms of our democratic order’
whose primary task was ‘to protect the Republic from all the schemes of her enemies’52. It
was an organisation for which the fact that someone might have scribbled ‘Russki go
home’ on a provincial Soviet memorial became a major concern53. By the time the German
Democratic Republic had been founded, the primary task of the ‘People’s Police’ was to
support and enforce a political transformation being directed from the centre and secure
the new socialist order against ‘agents and saboteurs’.
23 When looking back over the role of the Volkspolizei during the immediate postwar years,
perhaps the most striking thing about how social and political upheaval was policed in
East Germany is that there was relatively little effective policing of that upheaval. When
the police were most needed by the East German population they were least in a position
to do their job effectively; and when they later were in a position to police East German
society effectively – as the size of the force rose, as crime ebbed and as the Volkspolizei’s
clear-up rates for ordinary crime reached levels of which most police forces today would
be very proud54 – their main purpose was a rather different one. The history of policing in
postwar  East  Germany  was  not  so  much  of  a  force  which  had  developed  in  order
effectively to deal with the social and political upheaval of the postwar years, but rather
of  a  passing  of  the  postwar  upheaval  which allowed for  the  development  of  a  new,
thoroughly politicised type of policing. The task of dealing with the social consequences
of the war and the terrible conditions of the postwar years was overshadowed by the
political  project  of  East  Germany’s  Communist  masters.  The purpose of  the ‘People’s
Police’ was an overtly political one, and one which, in the short term at least, was not
exactly  crowned with  success –  as  their  stunning  failure  to  prevent  or  suppress  the
popular uprising of June 1953 demonstrated55.
24 How far the practice of the Volkspolizei diverged from that if the ideal-type of a police
force designed in the first instance to serve and protect the population can be seen in a
curious interchange between Karl Maron, the Chief of the German People’s Police, and the
editors of the newspaper Tägliche Rundschau in December 1952. By that time, the upheaval
of the immediate postwar period lay years in the past, the Cold War had entered its most
bitter phase, and East Germany had been launched by Walter Ulbricht on the precipitate
and disastrous campaign to lay ‘the foundations of socialism’. Maron had submitted an
article to the newspaper about the importance of traffic safety, but the Tägliche Rundschau
declined to publish it. Instead the newspaper’s editors asked the East German police chief
to write a different piece, this one ‘on the question of the intensified class struggle in the
GDR’. ‘We regard it as very important’, the newspaper’s editorial office wrote, ‘that our
readers  are  informed  on  the  basis  of  concrete  examples  about  the  work  of  the
Volkspolizei in the struggle against saboteurs and terrorists – especially in the villages –
and thus at the same time are educated to be increasingly vigilant and are called upon to
help in the task’56. A dedicated Communist functionary, Maron did as he was asked. The
problems of traffic safety would have to give way before the need to combat ‘saboteurs
and terrorists’. The Volkspolizei was no longer – if indeed it ever had been – ‘the servant
of the German people’; once the postwar emergency had passed, it could become what its
political masters wanted it to be: an instrument of the Cold War.
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NOTES
2. On this theme generally, see Bessel, Schumann (2003).
3. Mecklenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (= MLHA), Kreistag/Rat des Kreises Demmin, Nr. 46, ff.
62-64: [The Landrat des Kreises Demmin] to the Präsident des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern,
Abteilung Innere Verwaltung, [Demmin], 21 Nov. 1945, ‘Tätigkeitsbericht über die Verwaltung
des Kreises Demmin vom Mai bis November 1945’.
4. By comparison, in 1950 refugees comprised roughly one-sixth of the population of the Federal
Republic. See Benz (1998, p. 124).
5. On the Soviet dismantling policies, see Karlsch (1993); Naimark (1995, pp. 141-204); Buchheim,
(1995,  pp.  1051-1056).  On  rape  in  1945,  Hoerning,  (1985,  pp.  327-346);  Sander,  John  (1995);
Grossmann, (1997, pp. 33-52); Naimark (1995, pp. 69-140).
6. See, for example, the informative account by the Deputy Mayor of the Pomeranian town of
Anklam, who was installed in office in May 1945. See MLHA, Kreistag/Rat des Kreises Anklam, Nr.
39, ff. 29-33: II. Bürgermeister, ‘Tätigkeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 7. Mai bis zum 16. Juli 1945’,
Anklam, 16 July 1945.
7. Landeshauptarchiv  Sachsen-Anhalt  (=LHS  S-A),  MdI,  Nr.  3021,  ff.  44-47:  Chef  der  Polizei,
‘Rundererlaß Nr. I’, Halle/S., 21 May 1946.
8. MLHA,  Landesbehörde der Volkspolizei  (=LBdVP),  Nr.  9,  f.  25:  Chef  der  Polizei  des  Landes
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern an alle Polizisten, Schwerin, 13 Aug. 1946. Generally, Lindenberger
(1995, pp. 165-166).
9. Bundesarchiv Berlin (=BAB),  DO-1-7.  Nr.  23,  ff.  42-117 (here f.  49):  ‘Jahresbericht Deutsche
Verwaltung des Innern in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, 1946-1947’.
10. BAB, DO-1-7, Nr. 138, f. 66: ‘Personalstruktur. Monat: Juni 1947’. The highest percentage of
those who had been employed in the police before 1945, 15.2%, was among the Administrative
Police. Administrative Police also employed by far the highest percentage of women (46.0%, as
compared  with  12.1%  for  the  Volkspolizei  as  a  whole);  it  is  possible  therefore,  that  a
disproportionate number of Volkspolizisten who had worked for the police under the Nazis were
female clerical staff.
11. This point has been made before: Bessel (1995, pp. 522-523); Lindenberger (1995, p. 166). See
also Reinke (2001, pp. 58-59).
12. On this theme generally, see Bessel (2002b, pp. 239-258); Bessel, Schumann (2003).
13. See the suggestive remarks in Groehler (1992, p. 33).
14. See Wenzke (1994, p. 237); Lindenberger (1998, p. 99).
15. Der Spiegel, 15 Sept. 2001, p. 50.
16. MLHA, Kreistag/Rat des Kreises Demmin, Nr. 69, ff. 70-1: Kreis- und Ortspolizeibehörde to the
Präsident des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Demmin, 31 Aug. 1945.
17. See Reinke (2001, p. 58).
18. BAB, DO-1-7, Nr. 138, f. 66: ‘Personalstruktur, Monat: Juni 1947’.
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19. LHS S-A, LBdVP, Nr. 27, ff. 87-103 (here f. 96): ‘Protokoll der Konferenz der Polizeiführer der
Schutz-  und  Landpolizei  des  Bezirks  Merseburg  am  26.10.1946  10.00  Uhr  in  der  Provinzial 
verwaltung, Halle’.
20. See  LHA  S-A,  LBdVP,  Nr.  309,  f.  178:  Kommando  der  Schutzpolizei,  ‘Einrichtungen  und
Maßnahmen zum Schutze der Gesundheit von Polizeiangehörigen’, Magdeburg, 3 March 1947.
21. BAB,  DO-1-7,  Nr.  138,  ff.  76-86:  Landespolizei  Thüringen;  BAB,  DO-1-7,  Nr.  138,  ff.  89-94:
Landespolizei Sachsen-Anhalt; BA, DO-1-7, Nr. 138, ff. 99-109: Landespolizei Mecklenburg; BAB,
DO-1-7, Nr. 138, ff. 112-15: Landespolizei Brandenburg. Even in Saxony, which had been the first
East German Land to set up a training school, as late as July 1948 only a little over a quarter of the
police had been given training; in Leipzig the figure was a mere 11%. See Reinke (2001, p. 63).
22. LHA S-A, LBdVP, Nr. 27, ff. 87-103: ‘Protokoll der Konferenz der Polizeiführer der Schutz- und
Landespolizei des Bezirks Merseburg am 26.10.1946 10.00 Uhr, in der Provizialverwaltung, Halle’
(here the comments by Colonel Stachanowsky, ff. 87-88); Naimark (1995, pp. 356-357).
23. For example, for the 950 members of the Schutzpolizei in Magdeburg in November 1945 there
were only 13 7.65mm pistols available – one for the Commander, eight for the Section Chiefs
(‘Reviervorsteher’), two for ‘keeping watch on the bank’, one for ‘purposes of training’ and one
for  prisoner  transports.  See  LHS  S-A,  LBdVP,  Nr.  290,  ff.  14-15:  The  Polizeipräsident  to  the
Bezirkspräsident, Magdeburg, 8. Nov. 1945.
24. BAB, DO-1-7, Nr. 364, f. 23: Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern (Reschke and Wagner) to the
Sowjetische  Militäradministration  Deutschlands,  Abt.  für  innere  Angelegenheiten,
Oberstleutnant Smirnow, Berlin-Wilhelmsruh, [?] November 1946. Generally, see Naimark (1995,
p. 357).
25. LHA S-A, MdI, Nr. 4161, f. 129: Landesbehörde to the Minister des Innern, Halle (Saale), 4 Oct.
1948.
26. The Volkspolizei were given permission to set up a telex network in January 1947, but this
was not in place and functioning until August of that year. See BAB, DO-1-7, Nr. 19, ff. 42-117
(here f. 74): ‘Jahresbericht. Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone,
1946-1947’.
27. Naimark (1995, p. 358).
28. Naimark (1995, p. 116).
29. BAB, DO-1-7, Nr. 169, f. 1: Abteilung P[ersonal], ‘Todesfälle von Polizeiangehörigen’, to the
Präsident [of the Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern] via Vizepräsident Mielke, [Berlin], 2 July 1948.
30. Polizeikommissar F. Boettcher, ‘Die Anwendung der Schußwaffe’, Die Volkspolizei. Zeitschrift für
das gesamte Polizeiwesen, vol. i, no. 7 (September 1948), p. 6.
31. On East-West smuggling and illicit crossing of the demarcation line, see Bessel (1996, pp.
208-213).
32. MLHA, LBdVP, Nr. 283, f. 2: Kreispolizei Grimmen to the Kreiskammandantur in Grimmen,
Grimmen, 10 Oct. 1947.
33. BAB, DO-1-7, Nr. 146, ff. 63-64: undated report, probably from the Abteiling P [Personal] of
the DVdI,  describing conditions  in  March 1947.  Cracking down on black-market  trading also
could generate  popular  approval,  however,  while  ‘health raids’  (e.g.  for  venereal  disease)  by
police could provoke ‘the resistance of  the population’.  See MLHA, LBdVP, Nr.  283,  ff.  73-74:
Kreispolizeiamt Grimmen to the Ministerium für Innere Verwaltung und Planung, Abt. Polizei, in
Schwerin, Grimmen, 23 Dec. 1947.
34. See Bessel (1999, pp. 30-31).
35. Thus Hans Kahle, the first postwar Chief of Police in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. See MLHA,
LBdVP, Nr. 9, f. 25.
36. An extreme example is that of the city of Brandenburg, where in the spring of 1947 115 of the
130 available regular police officers had to guard Soviet installations. See BAB, DO-1-7, Nr. 138, ff.
112-25: Landespolizei Brandenburg (undated, probably written in April 1947).
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37. BAB, DO-1-7, Nr 205, ff.  34-6: Otto Hauschke to the Instrukteur der S.E.D. für die Provinz
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  focuses  on  the  tremendous  upheaval  experienced  by  Germans  in  the  Soviet
Occupation Zone after 1945, and how the new ‘People’s Police’ developed during the difficult
postwar years. Initially, when the needs of the population for police protection were greatest, the
new police force was least able to provide that protection. Lacking sufficient trained personnel,
equipment and powers, the Volkspolizei could not really effectively police a profoundly shaken
postwar  society.  However,  after  the  initial  emergency  had  passed,  the  Volkspolizei  grew  to
become a substantial force, but one whose main purpose was to serve the new political order
rather than meet the needs of the population.
Cet  article  porte  sur  l’énorme  bouleversement  qu’ont  vécu  les  Allemands  dans  la  zone
d’occupation soviétique après 1945 et sur le développement de la «police populaire» dans les
années difficiles de l’après-guerre. C’est dans les premiers temps, alors que la population avait le
plus besoin d’une protection policière, que la nouvelle force de police était la moins capable de
remplir  cette  tâche.  Manquant  de  personnel  entraîné,  d’équipement  et  de  pouvoir,  la
Volkspolizei  ne  pouvait  accomplir  sa  mission  dans  une  société  d’après-guerre  profondément
troublée.  Toutefois,  une fois l’urgence initiale passée,  la Volkspolizei  devint une organisation
d’une puissance considérable, dont la tâche principale, toutefois, était de servir l’ordre nouveau
plutôt que de répondre aux attentes de la population.
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